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INTRODUCTION 
“It is gratifying . . . to see the Court now looking to and relying upon 
legal history in determining the fundamental public character of the criminal 
trial,” Justice Blackmun wrote in his concurrence in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. 
v. Virginia, in which the Supreme Court first recognized a First Amendment 
public right of access.1 “The Court’s return to history is a welcome change in 
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1 448 U.S. 555, 601 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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direction.”2 History is central to the Supreme Court’s recognition of a 
constitutional right of access. The use of history in this context also raises 
questions about why history should play a role in recognizing constitutional 
rights and what types and durations of historical traditions should be required 
to justify constitutional protection. These questions underlie circuit and 
district courts’ application of Richmond Newspapers and its progeny. 
In Richmond Newspapers, the Court held that a public right to attend criminal 
trials is implicit in the First Amendment, based on the longstanding history of 
public trials and the positive value of their openness.3 This seminal case, decided 
in 1980, departed from three cases decided in the 1970s, in which the Court found 
that journalists do not have a First Amendment right to enter prisons to 
interview inmates.4 The Court subsequently extended its holding in Richmond 
Newspapers to grant a right of access to criminal trials at which juvenile victims of 
sexual assault testify,5 to voir dire proceedings6 and to preliminary hearings.7 
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, the Court synthesized its prior 
case law and articulated a two-part test to determine if the First Amendment 
recognizes a right of access to a particular proceeding.8 First, courts are to 
consider “whether the place and process have historically been open to the 
press and general public.”9 Second, courts are to evaluate whether “public 
 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 580. 
4 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 849-
50 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833-35 (1974). 
5 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 610-11 (1982). 
6 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 511 (1984) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise I]. 
7 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise 
II]. In addition to a First Amendment right of access, the Supreme Court has also recognized a 
common law public right of access to inspect and copy judicial records and documents. See Nixon 
v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (“It is clear that the courts . . . recognize a 
general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and 
documents.”). This Comment does not address the common law right of access. The First 
Amendment guarantee of access provides greater protection than the common law right because 
there is a higher bar to overcome the First Amendment right then the common law one. To 
overcome the First Amendment right, “it must be shown that the denial [of access] is 
necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that 
interest.” Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606-07. In contrast, a court may seal judicial 
documents if competing interests outweigh the public’s common law right of access. Nixon, 435 
U.S. at 598-99. Even though courts usually do not begin with constitutional claims, 
“[s]ometimes constitutional adjudication is essential, as when a case comes to the Supreme 
Court from a state court and only federal issues are open to consideration.” United States v. 
Blagojevich, 612 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2010). One circuit judge also wrote that “[g]iven the 
need for robust protection of a free press . . . , resolving the constitutional issues directly would 
ordinarily be the appropriate and sensible course for district courts to take, notwithstanding the 
general rule that we avoid such questions whenever possible.” United States v. Kaczynski, 154 
F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1998) (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
8 478 U.S. at 8. 
9 Id. 
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access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular 
process in question.”10 If the particular proceeding “passes these tests of 
experience and logic,” a qualified First Amendment right attaches.11 A court 
must then evaluate if the countervailing interests favoring closure override 
the First Amendment right of access.12 
Lower courts have applied this test, dubbed the “experience and logic 
test,” to evaluate rights of access to a variety of proceedings beyond criminal 
trials and different government documents.13 The test has been applied 
 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 9. 
12 Id. In Globe Newspaper Co., the Court analyzed whether a qualified right of access can be 
overridden in a different manner. It held that only a compelling governmental interest pursued by 
a means that is narrowly tailored to serve that interest can overcome a First Amendment right of 
access. 457 U.S. at 607. 
13 It is beyond the scope of this Comment, but circuit courts diverge on whether the 
experience and logic test is a test of general applicability or whether it should exclusively be applied 
in the criminal context. The Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have consistently applied the test in 
contexts other than criminal proceedings. For the Third Circuit, see PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele, 705 
F.3d 91, 104-07 (3d Cir. 2013) (summarizing Third Circuit case law on the application of the 
experience and logic test, and recognizing that the Third Circuit has applied the test to find a right 
of access to township meetings, deportation hearings, and administrative records). For the Sixth 
Circuit, see, e.g., In re Search of Fair Finance, 692 F.3d 424, 429-30 (6th Cir. 2012) (arguing that 
notwithstanding the fact that the experience and logic test initially was applied to criminal 
proceedings, the test can be applied in a variety of other contexts, and citing circuit case law applying 
the test to administrative hearings, deportation proceedings, and a variety of documents, including 
voter lists and state agency reports); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 694-96, 700-05 
(6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the experience and logic test is a test of general applicability and 
applying it to recognize a right of access to deportation hearings). For the Ninth Circuit, see, e.g., 
Leigh v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 892, 899-901 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the district court erred in not 
applying the experience and logic test to determine whether a photographer had a right of access 
to observe a wild horse gather roundup); Cal. First Amendment Coal. v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 
875-77 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying the experience and logic test to recognize a right of access to 
executions); Cal-Almond, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 960 F.2d 105, 109 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying 
the experience and logic test to recognize a right of access to voter lists). In some cases, courts in 
the D.C., First, and Tenth Circuits have refused to apply the experience and logic test outside of 
the criminal justice context. For the D.C. Circuit, see, e.g., Dhiab v. Trump, 852 F.3d 1087, 1092-
93 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding that the experience and logic test does not apply to access to habeas 
corpus proceedings involving sensitive information); Ctr. for Nat. Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dept. of 
Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (declining to apply the experience and logic test to a 
challenge to disclosure of information compiled during a governmental investigation because 
“[n]either the Supreme Court nor this Court ha[d] applied the Richmond Newspapers test outside 
the context of criminal judicial proceedings or the transcripts of such proceedings”). For the First 
Circuit, see El Dia, Inc. v. Hernandez Colon, 963 F.2d 488, 491, 495 (1st Cir. 1992) (declining to 
apply the experience and logic test to a challenge to a district order denying enjoinment of the 
Puerto Rico governor’s order restricting access to public documents because the court “seriously 
question[ed] whether Richmond Newspapers and its progeny carry positive implications favoring 
rights of access outside the criminal justice system”). For a court in the Tenth Circuit, see Okla. 
Observer v. Patton, 73 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1325 (D. Okla. 2014) (citing multiple Tenth Circuit cases 
questioning the applicability of the experience and logic test to contexts beyond the individual 
cases in which the Supreme Court applied it); see also Matthew D. Bunker & Clay Calvert, Could 
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inconsistently by many courts, even when different courts evaluated a right 
of access to the same proceeding. As a result, diverging case law has emerged 
on whether the First Amendment grants a right of access to deportation 
hearings14 and executions,15 for example. 
Scholarship on the application of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
right of access jurisprudence has addressed the topic from both broad and 
narrow perspectives.16 Analyzing the issue holistically, some scholars have 
criticized the experience and logic test and charted its inconsistent 
application by lower courts.17 Some judges and academics maintain that the 
test—and its use of history to justify a right of access—is not a sound 
analytical framework in light of the evolving nature of judicial and 
governmental proceedings18 and, in particular, the increasing movement of 
some government affairs from public court-like fora to private proceedings.19 
The majority of scholars analyzing the First Amendment right of access have 
taken a more narrow approach, focusing on whether a First Amendment right 
of access should attach to a particular proceeding or assessing how different 
courts have addressed access to a specific proceeding or judicial document.20 
But scholars have not analyzed the role of history in the Supreme Court 
and lower courts’ First Amendment right of access doctrine in depth. 
Professors Raleigh Hannah Levine and David Ardia both acknowledge that 
 
Wild Horses Drag Access Away from Courtrooms? Expanding First Amendment Rights to New Pastures, 
18 COMM. L. & POL’Y 247, 253-64 (2013) (analyzing the application of the experience and logic 
test beyond the criminal justice context). 
14 Compare N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 209 (3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting 
a First Amendment right of access to deportation hearings), with Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 700 
(recognizing a First Amendment right of access to deportation hearings). 
15 For cases recognizing a First Amendment right of access to view executions, see, e.g., Associated 
Press v. Otter, 682 F.3d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 2012); Cal. First Amendment Coalition, 299 F.3d at 875-77; 
Guardian News & Media LLC v. Ryan, 225 F. Supp. 3d 859, 869 (D. Ariz. 2016); Phila. Inquirer v. 
Wetzel, 906 F. Supp. 2d. 362, 370-71 (M.D. Pa. 2012). For cases rejecting a First Amendment right of 
access to view executions, see, e.g., Okla. Observer v. Patton, 73 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1324-28 (W.D. Okla. 
2014); Ark. Times, Inc. v. Norris, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3500 at *12 (E.D. Ark. 2008). 
16 For recent scholarship on lower courts’ application of the experience and logic test, see, e.g., 
David Ardia, Court Transparency and the First Amendment, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 835 (2017); Raleigh 
Hannah Levine, Toward a New Public Access Doctrine, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1739 (2006); Kathleen 
Olson, Courtroom Access After 9/11: A Pathological Perspective, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 461, 485-88 (2002). 
17 See Ardia, supra note 16, at 840 (describing the experience and logic test as a “confusing and 
inconsistent doctrinal roadmap for dealing with public access questions”); Levine, supra note 16, 
1758-76 (detailing the different ways lower courts have applied the experience and logic prongs, and 
showing how whether a court conducts a broad or narrow historical inquiry affects whether the 
experience prong is met). 
18 Kimba M. Wood, Re-Examining the Access Doctrine, COMM. LAW., Winter 1994, at 3, 4-5. 
19 Judith Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in Courts: Changing the Experiences and Logics of the 
Public’s Role in Court-Based ADR, 15 NEV. L. J. 1631, 1670-71 (2015). 
20 Seven hundred and forty-three law review articles on Westlaw cite Press-Enterprise II, the 
majority of which adopt this second approach. 
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history is applied and used in different ways, and Levine argues that some of 
the problems posed by the test are rooted in the Supreme Court’s development 
of the doctrine.21 But they do not chart different taxonomies of uses of history 
in the cases or analyze which approaches are in line with the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence. This focus deserves attention for two reasons. First, some 
scholars have argued that the experience prong is the determinative factor.22 
For example, in reviewing the lower courts’ application of the experience and 
logic test, Levine claimed that no court has held that a proceeding that passed 
the experience prong failed the logic prong.23 Second, using history as a basis 
for constitutional rights raises interpretative questions. As Professor Jack 
Balkin articulated, “Appeals to tradition are complicated by the fact that 
consensus in practice and belief often disappears when we inspect history more 
closely.”24 Balkin continued, “To argue from tradition or ethos, one must make 
interpretive judgments about what aspects of American history are central and 
. . . what aspects are peripheral . . . or have been . . . repudiated as time has 
passed.”25 Using history as a basis for a constitutional right also raises questions 
about “what kind of history counts, [and] how unequivocal the history must 
be . . . .”26 These challenges are demonstrated by this area of law because close 
examination of the case law reveals that lower courts have interpreted the 
Supreme Court’s mandate to evaluate history to recognize a constitutional 
right of access in different ways. 
This Comment addresses this dearth in scholarship by identifying eight 
ways lower courts use history to analyze the experience prong of the 
experience and logic test. I identified these taxonomies by reviewing 185 
federal circuit court opinions in Westlaw that cited Press-Enterprise II, 
seventy-six of which applied the experience and logic test. I also reviewed 
some federal district court and state court opinions cited in the circuit court 
opinions and scholarly articles. I focus on the range of ways courts have 
handled “mixed history”—a proceeding that is replete with examples of both 
open and closed practices. This Comment analyzes to what degree these 
different taxonomies are in line with, or depart from, the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on the topic. Like Levine, I argue that some of the different 
approaches reflect uncertainty and unanswered questions in the Supreme 
 
21 See Ardia, supra note 16, at 859-61; Levine, supra note 16, at 1742, 1756-77. 
22 See Ardia, supra note 16, at 859 (“[F]or many courts, whether there has been a history of public 
access to a particular court proceeding is determinative of whether a First Amendment right of access 
exists.”); Wood, supra note 18, at 6 (“[T]he effect of the current emptiness of the function prong is to 
make the history prong of the access test even more influential than it would otherwise be.”). 
23 Levine, supra note 16, at 1777-78. 
24 Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 678 (2013).  
25 Id. 
26 Curtis A. Bradley & Neil Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity and 
Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 21. 
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Court’s opinions. This analysis demonstrates that lower courts have little 
direction regarding how to conceptualize historical traditions that are beset 
by open and closed practices, or proceedings that lack a historical tradition of 
access because they are relatively new. Nevertheless, while this Comment 
shows that a range of approaches to the experience prong are in line with the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, analyzing the different uses of history by 
lower courts in detail underscores scholars’ critiques of the doctrine. In 
particular, it shows that the experience prong is not suited to address new 
practices when there may be no history of openness or closure, and that the 
emphasis on history does not allow the right of access doctrine to 
accommodate changes in governmental practice and innovation.27 
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I analyzes the Supreme Court’s 
right of access jurisprudence. Part II surveys lower courts’ application of the 
experience prong by identifying eight ways courts apply this part of the 
experience and logic test. Part III articulates reasons for and against the use of 
history as a basis for constitutional protection. Part IV analyzes the degree to 
which the practices of lower courts are in line with or depart from the reasoning 
of, and the historical constructions in, the Supreme Court jurisprudence. The 
Comment concludes by assessing what the varied ways courts use history in 
this context demonstrates about the foundations of this right. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S RIGHT OF ACCESS JURISPRUDENCE 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the First Amendment public right 
of access includes two lines of cases: one recognizing a First Amendment public 
right of access to observe criminal trials and other aspects of the criminal process 
in court,28 and an earlier line of cases holding that members of the press do not 
have a First Amendment public right of access to interview inmates in prison.29 
 
27 It is beyond the scope of this Comment, but after charting different taxonomies and 
analyzing to what degree they reflect the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, further study is required 
to compare lower courts’ application of history in this context to other aspects of First Amendment 
jurisprudence, including the public forum doctrine, and other areas of constitutional law in which 
courts appeal to tradition and history, such as substantive due process. 
28 See generally Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Press-Enterprise Co. 
v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 
(1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
29 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe 
v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974). It is beyond the scope of this Comment, but the First 
Amendment right of access to criminal trials interacts with an accused’s Sixth Amendment rights in 
myriad ways. See generally MATTHEW D. BUNKER, JUSTICE AND THE MEDIA: RECONCILING FAIR 
TRIALS AND A FREE PRESS (1997). For example, the Supreme Court has considered the public right 
of access when evaluating a convicted person’s challenge to the closure of a courtroom. See Weaver 
v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1910 (2017) (“The public-trial right also protects some interests 
that do not belong to the defendant. After all, the right to an open courtroom protects the rights of 
the public at large, and the press, as well as the rights of the accused.”). Additionally, in Presley v. 
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Less than a decade before recognizing a First Amendment public right of 
access to criminal trials, the Supreme Court decided three cases rejecting 
journalists’ First Amendment challenges to various prison regulations limiting 
journalists’ abilities to interview inmates. In Pell v. Procunier, journalists and 
inmates challenged a California law that prohibited members of the press from 
conducting face-to-face interviews with prisoners who they requested to 
interview.30 In Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., journalists argued that the Federal 
Bureau of Prison’s policy precluding journalists from interviewing prisoners 
violated the First Amendment.31 Four years later, in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., a 
California prison denied journalists’ request to inspect and take pictures of a 
jail facility after they reported on the suicide of a prisoner.32 The journalists 
claimed that the prison’s refusal to provide a means for the public to be 
informed about the conditions in the jail violated the First Amendment.33  
Garnering a full majority of the Court in Pell and Saxbe and a splintered 
Court in Houchins, the Supreme Court rejected the three claims on the same 
basis.34 It cited prior precedent that “the First Amendment does not 
guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not 
available to the public generally.”35 Because the public does not have access to 
prisoners, “newsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons or their 
inmates beyond that afforded the general public.”36 The Court claimed that 
whether prisons should be open to the public is a question of policy best 
decided by a legislative body.37 It did not give credence to journalists’ 
arguments that the need to inform the public about prison conditions and 
shed light on abuse justified a right of access.38 These cases are important 
 
Georgia, the Court held that an accused has a Sixth Amendment right to a public voir dire proceeding 
because the First Amendment recognizes a public right of access to voir dire proceedings. 558 U.S. 
209, 212-13 (2010). Additionally, in Tennessee v. Lane, the Supreme Court articulated that the public 
right of access to criminal proceedings is one of four access-to-courts rights that Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act enforces. 541 U.S. 509, 523 (2004). The other rights are the right of 
a criminal defendant to be present at all critical stages of the trial, the right of a litigant to have a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard in judicial proceedings, and the right of a criminal defendant 
to a trial by a jury composed of a fair crosssection of the community. Id. Conceptualizing the public 
right of access as on par with these foundational rights of the accused underscores the importance 
of, and deference to, the First Amendment right of access. 
30 417 U.S. at 819. 
31 417 U.S. at 844. 
32 438 U.S. at 3. 
33 Id. at 4. 
34 In Houchins, Justices White and Rehnquist joined Chief Justice Burger’s opinion, Justice 
Stewart filed an opinion concurring in the judgement, and Justice Stevens filed a dissent that Justices 
Brennan and Powell joined. Justices Blackmun and Marshall did not participate in the case. Id. at 1. 
35 Pell, 417 U.S. at 833 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684-85 (1972)). 
36 Id. at 834. 
37 Houchins, 438 U.S. at 12. 
38 Id. at 8-9. 
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background for the subsequent cases recognizing a First Amendment right of 
access because they stand for the proposition that the press does not have a 
greater right of access than the public. 
In 1980, the Supreme Court next addressed whether the First 
Amendment recognizes a right of access to criminal trials. Criminal trials are 
a foil to prisons because criminal trials have historically been open to the 
public. In Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, journalists challenged a judicial 
order closing a murder trial to the press and to the public.39 In its plurality 
opinion, authored by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held for the first time 
that “the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the 
First Amendment.”40 The Court acknowledged that “without the freedom to 
attend such trials, which people have exercised for centuries, important 
aspects of freedom of speech and ‘of the press could be eviscerated.’”41 
The Court recognized this constitutional right based on the long history 
of trials being open to the public and multiple positive benefits of the 
practice. The Court sketched the history of open trials, noting that trials 
were open to the public in England since before the Norman Conquest in 
the eleventh century, and remained so through the fourteenth to sixteenth 
centuries.42 Open trials were also an aspect of the judicial systems of 
colonial America, and some colonies codified by law that trials must remain 
open to the public.43 Chief Justice Burger’s opinion concluded its review of 
the history of open trials with evidence from the First Continental 
Congress in 1774, and described the historical tradition as “unbroken” and 
“uncontradicted.”44 Based on its historical survey, the Court concluded, 
“[T]he historical evidence demonstrates conclusively that at the time when 
our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had 
long been presumptively open.”45 
The Court continued that the public quality of trials is “no quirk of 
history” but “has long been recognized as an indispensable attribute of an 
Anglo-American trial.”46 The plurality opinion offered multiple policy 
justifications for the practice. It argued that open trials increase confidence in 
the administration of justice because they assure the public that proceedings 
are conducted fairly, discourage perjury, and provide the public with an 
 
39 448 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1980). 
40 Id. at 580. Justice Rehnquist was the sole justice to dissent in Richmond Newspapers. Justice 
Rehnquist was unwilling to recognize an implied constitutional right of access and also raised federalism 
concerns about a First Amendment right of access. Id. at 605-06 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
41 Id. at 580 (majority opinion) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)). 
42 Id. at 565-66. 
43 Id. at 567-68. 
44 Id. at 568, 573. 
45 Id. at 569. 
46 Id. at 569. 
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opportunity to understand the criminal justice system.47 The Court also found 
that open trials have “community therapeutic value” as open proceedings 
provide an “outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion” after a 
shocking crime and decrease the likelihood that people will resort to vigilante 
measures in response to a tragic incident.48 The Court acknowledged that 
these reasons are “as valid today as in centuries past.”49 Even though the First 
Amendment does not expressly address a right of access, the plurality opinion 
wrote that it is implicit in the First Amendment because the amendment 
“assure[s] freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning 
of government.”50 The plurality opinion acknowledged that the First 
Amendment “prohibit[s the] government from limiting the stock of 
information from which members of the public may draw.”51 Thus it held that 
in the context of trials, “the First Amendment . . . prohibit[s the] government 
from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the 
public at the time that [the] Amendment was adopted.”52 
Justice Brennan’s concurrence is an important complement to the plurality 
opinion, and it was incorporated into the majority opinions of later Supreme 
Court cases involving the First Amendment right of access. Justice Brennan 
explained why history is an important consideration in recognizing a 
constitutional right of access to criminal trials. Justice Brennan wrote that “the 
case for a right of access has special force when drawn from an enduring and 
vital tradition of public entree to particular proceedings or information” because 
“the Constitution caries the gloss of history” and because “a tradition of 
accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experience.”53 Justice Brennan’s 
construction of the historical tradition of public trials was more expansive than 
the one Chief Justice Burger provided. Justice Brennan extended his historical 
inquiry beyond the framing of the Constitution and recognized that the majority 
of states secure the right to public trials by statute and that the Supreme Court 
has “persistently defended the public character of the trial process.”54 
In addition to the justifications offered for a right to attend trials in Chief 
Justice Burger’s opinion, Justice Brennan emphasized the “structural value of 
public access” to criminal trials.55 In particular, Justice Brennan recognized 
the “structural role [the First Amendment] play[s] in securing and fostering 
 
47 Id. at 569-72. 
48 Id. at 570-71. 
49 Id. at 573. 
50 Id. at 575. 
51 Id. at 576 (quoting First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
54 Id. at 591. 
55 Id. at 598. 
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our republican system of self-government” and the underlying assumption 
that “public debate . . . must be informed.”56 The “structural model links the 
First Amendment to that process of communication necessary for a 
democracy to survive,” Justice Brennan wrote.57 But Justice Brennan 
recognized that the “structural value” of increased information can be applied 
to “theoretically endless” situations, and thus maintained that “resolution of 
First Amendment public access claims in individual cases must be strongly 
influenced by the weight of historical practice and by an assessment of the 
specific structural value of public access in the circumstances.”58 Thus Justice 
Brennan conceived appeals to history and an assessment of the “specific 
structural value of public access” as limiting the application of the First 
Amendment right the Court recognized in Richmond Newspapers. 
The principles outlined in Richmond Newspapers were applied two years 
later in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court. A Massachusetts statute, as 
construed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, required trial 
judges to exclude the general public and the press from courtrooms when 
victims of some sexual offenses who were under the age of eighteen 
testified.59 After being denied access to a rape trial involving the rapes of a 
seventeen-year-old and two sixteen-year-olds, the Globe Newspaper 
Company argued that the statute violated the press’s First Amendment right 
to attend a public trial.60 In an opinion authored by Justice Brennan that 
garnered a five-vote majority, the Supreme Court held that the statute 
violated the First Amendment because, citing Richmond Newspapers, criminal 
trials have historically been open to the press and public, and because, 
repeating many of the arguments for public access articulated in the plurality 
opinion and in Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Richmond Newspapers, public 
access to trials plays a “significant role in the functioning of the judicial 
process and the government as a whole.”61 
The Court’s opinion focused on the history of open trials broadly and did 
not mention that historically trials have been closed while sexual assault 
victims testified. This prompted Chief Justice Burger, who authored the 
plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers, to dissent in Globe Newspapers.62 
Chief Justice Burger argued that the Court’s historical inquiry “ignores the 
weight of historical practice” because “[t]here is clearly a long history of 
exclusion of the public from trials involving sexual assaults, particularly those 
 
56 Id. at 587. 
57 Id. at 587-88. 
58 Id. at 588, 597-98. 
59 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
60 Id. at 598. 
61 Id. at 606. 
62 Id. at 612 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
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against minors” and because “[s]everal states have longstanding provisions 
allowing closure of cases involving sexual assaults against minors.”63 The 
majority of the Court conducted a broad historical inquiry, but Chief Justice 
Burger’s dissent argued for a more narrow construction. 
Two years later, in Press-Enterprise I, the Court extended the First 
Amendment right of access to voir dire proceedings with a unanimous 
judgment.64 In a California murder trial, voir dire took six weeks, and all but 
approximately three of the days were closed to the public.65 The petitioner 
sought the transcript of the proceedings, which the judge denied.66 Like in 
Richmond Newspapers, the Court charted the history of public jury 
examinations in England and in colonial America, and ended its inquiry with 
the trial of two British soldiers charged with murder after the Boston 
Massacre.67 The Court claimed that the justifications for open trials offered 
in Richmond Newspapers apply to this part of the trial as well, and recognized 
a First Amendment right to attend voir dire proceedings.68 
In Press-Enterprise II, the Court recognized a qualified First Amendment 
right of access to preliminary hearings in a criminal case.69 Synthesizing its 
case law, the Court articulated a test to determine if a right of access attaches. 
[O]ur decisions have emphasized two complementary considerations. First, 
because a ‘tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of 
experience’ (citation omitted) we have considered whether the place and 
process have historically been open to the press and general public . . . . Second, 
in this setting the Court has traditionally considered whether public access 
plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in 
question . . . . These considerations of experience and logic are, of course, 
related, for history and experience shape the functioning of governmental 
processes.70 
The Court also maintained that whether a First Amendment right of access 
attaches does not revolve on the “label we give the event, i.e. ‘trial’ or otherwise.”71 
 
63 Id. at 614. Chief Justice Burger also argued that the law was constitutional in light of the 
weight of the state’s interest in protecting minor victims of rape. Id. at 615-16. 
64 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 511 (1984). Chief Justice Burger wrote 
the Court’s opinion, and Justices Blackmun, Stevens and Marshall wrote separate concurring 
opinions, of which Justice Marshall’s concurred in the judgment. 
65 Id. at 503. 
66 Id. at 503-04. 
67 Id. at 505-08. 
68 Id. at 508-11. 
69 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986). 
70 Id. at 8-9 
71 Id. at 7. 
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The scope of the historical inquiry in this case differed from the three 
prior Supreme Court opinions. Unlike the prior plurality and majority 
opinions that surveyed English history and early eighteenth century 
American history, the Court began its inquiry with the trial of Aaron Burr 
in 1807, and concluded that from this trial “until the present day, the near 
uniform practice of state and federal courts has been to conduct 
preliminary hearings in open court.”72 The Court acknowledged that 
several states allow preliminary hearings to be closed on the motion of the 
accused, but claimed that the proceedings are still presumptively open to 
the public and are only closed for cause.73 The Court claimed that the 
justifications for public access to criminal trials cited in its prior cases are 
applicable to preliminary hearings as well.74 
Justice Stevens dissented in Press-Enterprise II because he reached the 
opposite conclusion applying the experience and logic test. On the 
experience prong, Justice Stevens argued that “[t]he historical evidence 
proffered in this case is far less probative than the evidence adduced in 
prior cases granting public access.”75 In particular, there was no common-
law right of access to preliminary proceedings at the time of the adoption 
of the First Amendment, and while in some states the proceedings have 
been open to the public, in other states, including California and Michigan, 
they have been closed.76 Thus, the majority and dissent articulated two 
different approaches to interpreting historical phenomenon that involve 
both open and closed practices. The majority is satisfied that the 
continuous evidence of open preliminary hearings is sufficient to satisfy 
the experience prong, even if at times preliminary hearings have been 
closed and the practice was not rooted in common law. But Justice Stevens 
cited specific states in which preliminary hearings were closed to 
undermine the historical tradition of openness. 
In 1993, the Supreme Court refined the experience prong in El Vocero de 
Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico by holding in a per curiam decision that a court 
should not “look to the particular practice of any one jurisdiction, but instead 
to the ‘experience in that type or kind of hearing throughout the United 
States.’”77 Besides this wrinkle, the Supreme Court has not revisited its First 
Amendment right of access jurisprudence. The Court has not considered 
what type of history is necessary or sufficient to satisfy the experience prong, 
 
72 Id. at 10. 
73 Id. at 11. 
74 Id. at 11-12. 
75 Id. at 21 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
76 Id. at 22-24. 
77 508 U.S. 147, 150 (1993). 
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or addressed whether a right of access extends to, and whether the experience 
and logic test applies to, contexts outside of the criminal trial process. 
II. LOWER COURTS’ APPLICATION OF THE EXPERIENCE PRONG 
Lower courts have applied the Supreme Court’s mandate to evaluate 
history to determine if a First Amendment right of access attaches in 
different ways. Careful review of lower court case law reveals eight different 
modes of applying the experience prong, summarized in the table below. 
 
Table 1: Lower Courts’ Eight Different Applications  






1. Faithful to the Supreme Court’s 
experience prong 
2. Framing-era history 
3. State statutes 
4. Recent history and practices 
5. Mixed history 
 
6. Rejecting historical analysis 
altogether 
7. Analogous historical inquiry 
8. Not deciding the First 
Amendment question because 
closure was justified 
 
 
1. Faithful to the Supreme Court’s Experience Prong 
 
Some courts have been faithful to the Supreme Court’s construction of 
the experience prong. In such situations, courts have either held that because 
there is no historical tradition of access to a particular proceeding or 
document, no constitutional right of access attaches, or courts have 
recognized a right of access because they found a sufficient historical tradition 
of openness. In some scenarios, courts have denied a right of access because 
there was no history of openness including access to discovery in criminal 
cases,78 to wiretap applications,79 to student disciplinary records,80 and to 
presentencing reports.81 In various cases, journalists have sought access to 
records from grand jury proceedings and search warrants; circuit courts have 
repeatedly held that there is no First Amendment right of access to these 
 
78 United States v. Kravetz, 706 F.3d 47, 54 (1st Cir. 2013). 
79 In re Application of the New York Times Co. to Unseal Wiretap & Search Warrant Materials, 
557 F.3d 401, 410 (2d Cir. 2009). 
80 United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 823 (6th Cir. 2002). 
81 United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir. 1989). 
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records because the proceedings are historically and presumptively secret.82 
Of the eight approaches outlined, this seems to be the most common.83 
In some situations, courts have found that there is no longstanding 
tradition of access, and accordingly denied a right of access, because the 
proceedings, documents, or laws at issue were of recent creation. Three 
examples illustrate this point.84 In 2013, the Fourth Circuit held that there is 
no First Amendment right of access to a sealed order, issued pursuant to the 
Stored Communications Act, that required social network providers to turn 
over subscriber information to the government for an ongoing criminal 
investigation.85 The court found that there was no long tradition of access to 
orders required by the law because the law was only enacted in 1986.86 
In addition, journalists in 1997 sought access to a plea agreement that 
was submitted to a district court in Washington, D.C., so the court could 
 
82 For cases denying right of access to grand jury-related proceedings, see, e.g., In re Grand 
Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 493 F.3d 152, 154 (D.C. Cir. 2007); In re Motions of Dow Jones & Co., 
Inc. 142 F.3d 496, 502-03 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. Smith, 123 F.3d 140, 148 (3d Cir. 1997); 
In re Subpoena to Testify Before Grand Jury Directed to Custodian of Records, 864 F.2d 1559, 1562 
(11th Cir. 1989). For cases denying right of access to search warrant affidavits and materials, see, e.g., 
In re Search of Fair Finance, 692 F.3d 424, 430-31 (6th Cir. 2012); In re Application of the New York 
Times Co. to Unseal Wiretap & Search Warrant Materials, 577 F.3d at 410; Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 
886 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989); Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 
1989). But see In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Thomas Gunn, 855 F.2d 
569, 573 (8th Cir. 1988) (recognizing a First Amendment right of access to search warrant 
applications and receipts because they are routinely filed with the clerk of the court without seal, 
and because judicial records and documents have historically been open to public inspection). 
83 For other cases adopting this approach, see In re Copay Press, Inc., 518 F.3d 1022, 1028 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (denying right of access to a memorandum and documents supporting the government’s 
motion to seal because there is “no historical experience of access to such documents, and logic 
militates against granting such access”); United States v. Wolfson, 55 F.3d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(recognizing that there is no history “of access on the part of the public to documents to which the 
defendant himself has been denied”); Calder v. Internal Revenue Serv., 890 F.2d 781, 784 (5th Cir. 
1989) (denying right of access to Al Capone’s IRS records because there is no history of access to 
such documents); Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1175 (3d Cir. 1986) (denying 
right of access to administrative records of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Resources because plaintiff has not alleged the existence of a historic tradition of access). 
84 For other cases that hold that there is no historical tradition of access because the proceeding 
at issue was relatively new, see In re Morning Song Bird Food Litigation, 831 F.3d 765, 768, 777 (6th 
Cir. 2016) (denying right of access to objections attached to a presentence reports sought by class 
members in a civil lawsuit because objections historically have not been publicly available, as before 
1975, most courts did not even permit defendants to access their presentence report and disclosure 
to defendants only became automatic in 1983); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 
854 F.2d 900, 903-04 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that there is no history of access to summary jury 
trials because they have been in existence for less than ten years); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 
F.2d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1986) (denying right of access to discovery proceedings because “the pretrial 
discovery process is a fairly recent invention,” although discovery rules were enacted in 1938). 
85 In re Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(D), 
707 F.3d 283, 291-92 (4th Cir. 2013). 
86 Id. at 291. 
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rule on the government’s motion to seal the agreement.87 The D.C. Circuit 
requires the government to file a plea agreement and a motion to seal the 
agreement with a district court and mandates the district court to enter 
notice of the motion in the public docket.88 This procedure, established by 
the court in Washington Post v. Robinson89 in 1991, was created to ensure “that 
the press and public have a fair opportunity to assert their presumptive First 
Amendment right of access to any agreement on which a plea is entered.”90 
Nonetheless, assessing journalists’ right of access to the agreement, the 
court found that “there can hardly be a historical tradition of access to the 
documents accompanying a procedure that did not exist until Robinson 
imposed it in 1991.”91 This example is instructive because it recognizes a 
court’s awareness of a need to change its procedures to accommodate the 
First Amendment right of access, but then does not provide a way for the 
experience and logic test to account for the change in practice. 
A year after the D.C. Circuit’s decision in United States v. El-Sayegh, the 
Tenth Circuit was presented with the question whether a newspaper has a right 
of access to sealed information about fees and costs filed under the Criminal 
Justice Act by court appointed criminal defense attorneys.92 The court held that 
there was no right of access to the material.93 Because the Criminal Justice Act 
was only passed in 1964, the “CJA is too recent in origin to have developed any 
‘history’ or ‘tradition’ with respect to press access to documents required by that 
Act.”94 These three cases all found that there was no history of access because 
the documents sought were related to laws or procedures of recent creation. 
Some courts’ historical analyses resemble Richmond Newspapers’s treatment of 
the experience prong. In Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, two newspapers 
challenged the Connecticut state courts’ practice of sealing some docket sheets.95 
The Second Circuit relied on history from England and the United States to 
demonstrate that docket sheets historically were open to the public, including 
state statutes passed in the early years of the United States that required clerks 
to maintain open records of judicial proceedings in the form of docket books.96 
In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, journalists challenged a Massachusetts 
statute that required records in criminal cases that did not result in 
 
87 United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
88 Id. 
89 935 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
90 El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d at 159 (emphasis omitted). 
91 Id. at 161. 
92 United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246, 1250 (10th Cir. 1998). 
93 Id. at 1254-55. 
94 Id. at 1257. 
95 380 F.3d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 2004). 
96 Id. at 94-95. 
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convictions to be sealed.97 The court relied on the delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention and Congress’s use of pamphlets reproducing 
proceedings of political prosecutions and centuries of treason, heresy, and 
sedition trials in England housed in the Philadelphia Library to demonstrate 
historical access and the “value placed on access to records of secretive 
criminal proceedings.”98 The court used “historical materials available to the 
framers of the Constitution” to rebut the appellee’s position that “our 
historical tradition has not been one of presumptive openness.”99 
In addition, when assessing constitutional claims of access to plea and 
sentencing hearings, some courts have merely written that plea and sentencing 
hearings are typically held in open court in order to satisfy the experience 
prong.100 Notably, the cases in which courts appear most faithful to the 
Supreme Court’s construction of the experience prong and find that this part 
of the test is met involve access to different aspects of the judicial system. 
 
2. Framing-Era History 
 
Taking the most extreme approach, one court required Framing-era 
history to satisfy the experience prong. The Tennessee Press Association 
challenged the Tennessee General Assembly’s practice of closing legislative 
meetings to the public.101 The court rejected the plaintiff ’s claim of a First 
Amendment right of access to state legislative meetings because “the First 
Amendment was not adopted against a backdrop of a long history of 
legislative sessions being presumptively open.”102 The court required 
 
97 868 F.2d 497, 499-500 (1st Cir. 1989). 
98 Id. at 503. 
99 Id. 
100 For plea and sentencing hearings, see In re Heart Newspapers, L.L.C., 641 F.3d 168, 177 (5th 
Cir. 2011) (“Sentencing proceedings have historically been open to the press and public.”); Wash. Post 
v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“In accord with the rulings of our sister Second, Fourth, 
and Ninth Circuits, we now find that plea agreements have traditionally been open to the public.”); 
Oregonian Publ’g Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 920 F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[W]e observe 
that plea agreements have typically been open to the public. Nothing has been provided to suggest 
historical practice is to the contrary.”); United States v. Haller, 837 F.2d 84, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Plea 
hearings have typically been open to the public, and such access, as in the case of criminal trials, . . . 
serves to allow public scrutiny of the conduct of courts and prosecutors.”); In re Wash. Post Co., 807 
F.2d 383, 389 (4th Cir. 1986) (“[H]istorical and functional considerations weigh in favor of finding a 
First Amendment right of access here. Sentencings have historically been open to the public; while 
plea hearings do not have the same long tradition, they are typically held in open court.”). In addition, 
this approach was adopted with respect to access to oral arguments in appellate proceedings. See United 
States v. Moussaoui, 65 F. App’x 881, 890 (4th Cir. 2003) (arguing that appellate oral arguments “have 
historically been open to the public, and the very considerations that counsel in favor of openness of 
criminal trial support a similar degree of openness in appellate proceedings”). 
101 Mayhew v. Wilder, 46 S.W.3d 760, 765 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). 
102 Id. at 777. 
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Framing-era history to justify a right of access in spite of the fact that 
Tennessee’s Sunshine Law, which required some branches of state 
government to hold some meetings in public, was passed in 1974.103 
 
3. State Statutes 
 
Other courts found evidence that state statutes guarantee openness to a 
particular proceeding sufficient to satisfy the experience prong. In Whiteland 
Woods, L.P. v. Township of West Whiteland, a township planning commission 
banned the videotaping of a meeting, and a building company filed a lawsuit 
against the township arguing that the policy violated the First Amendment.104 
The Third Circuit recognized that the company had a constitutional right of 
access to the planning commission meeting, although it held that the right 
did not extend to videotaping the meeting.105 The court maintained that the 
experience prong was satisfied because public access to such meetings is 
guaranteed by two Pennsylvania statutes: the Sunshine Act of 1986 and the 
Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code of 1968.106  
In Cal-Almond, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture did not provide an almond processor and distributor a list of 
California almond growers eligible to vote in a referendum that it requested 
via a freedom of information request.107 The Ninth Circuit recognized a First 
Amendment right of access to voter lists.108 It held that “it seems likely that a 
tradition of public access to voter lists exists” both because several state 
statutes expressly provide for access, including Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, 
Nevada, Oregon, and Washington, and because none bar public access.109 
Thus, these cases relied on access guaranteed by laws, many of which were 
passed in the last half of the twentieth century, to satisfy the experience prong. 
 
4. Recent History and Practices 
 
Some courts have relied on recent histories and practices to satisfy the 
experience prong. Three cases illustrate this approach.110 In August 2011, Erie 
 
103 Id. 
104 193 F.3d 177, 178-79 (3d Cir. 1999). 
105 Id. at 184. 
106 Id. at 181. 
107 960 F.2d 105, 106 (9th Cir. 2012). 
108 Id. at 109. 
109 Id. 
110 For other cases adopting this approach, see N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit 
Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 301 n.11 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that Transit Authority Bureau hearings are 
presumptively open to the public in part because for the two decades that the hearings were only 
held in criminal court, and were not also held in a separate administrative proceeding, they were 
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County, New York, entered into a settlement agreement with the Department 
of Justice following an investigation into violations of prisoners’ constitutional 
rights at prisons in the county.111 As part of the settlement, the parties agreed 
that a monitor would file compliance reports, and the district court permitted 
the reports to be filed under seal.112 The New York Civil Liberties Union 
intervened for the reports to be unsealed.113 Reversing the district court’s 
determination that a First Amendment right of access did not attach to the 
reports, the Second Circuit relied on the fact that monitor reports in four 
recent, similar cases were public to demonstrate a tradition of openness.114 
In Applications of National Broadcasting Co., a television station sought to 
obtain sealed documents relating to a motion to disqualify a judge, and the 
district court held that the television station did not satisfy the experience 
and logic test.115 The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling, and 
found a qualified right of access to the information sought.116 The Sixth 
Circuit held that there is “clearly a tradition of accessibility to disqualification 
proceedings” because, reviewing Sixth Circuit cases involving the 
disqualification of judges from 1924 to 1984, it found no cases in which the 
proceedings were closed or the records were sealed.117 The court found that 
the absence of a closed proceeding in the Sixth Circuit during a sixty-year 
period was enough to satisfy the experience prong. 
In addition, in July 1981, the White House excluded television media 
representatives from the press pool, and various news stations claimed that 
this action violated their First Amendment right of access.118 The district 
court held that the experience prong of the test was satisfied because there is 
a “history of pool coverage of presidential activities going back through 
several past Administrations in which television news representatives took 
 
open to the public); United States v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that 
“historically, sentences have been imposed in open court” as demonstrated by “[n]umerous cases 
from over a century ago describ[ing] sentencing proceedings held in open court”); Leigh v. Salazar, 
954 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1100-01 (D. Nev. 2013) (holding that wild horse gathers have historically been 
open to the public based on the Bureau of Labor Management’s policy directive of holding guided 
public observation days and testimony from a journalist that for twelve years she has attended public 
wild horse gathers on public land). The district court in Leigh v. Salazar applied the experience and 
logic test after the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s initial ruling because 
the district court had not applied the experience and logic test to determine whether a photographer 
had a right of access to observe a wild horse gather roundup. Id. at 899. 
111 United States v. Erie Cty., N.Y., 763 F.3d 235, 236-37 (2d Cir. 2014). 
112 Id. at 237-38. 
113 Id. at 238. 
114 Id. at 241-42. 
115 828 F.2d 340, 341-42 (6th Cir. 1987). 
116 Id. at 345. 
117 Id. at 344. 
118 See, e.g., Cable News Network, Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 518 F. Supp. 1238, 1239-40 (N.D. Ga. 1982). 
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part.”119 In these cases, courts surveyed practices, and as long as they found a 
continuous practice of openness—even a recent one or one of relatively short 
duration—courts have held that the experience prong was satisfied. None of 
these cases acknowledge that the tradition of access they presented is 
narrower and more limited than those in the Supreme Court cases. 
 
5. Mixed History 
 
Courts have approached cases of “mixed history”—proceedings that are 
replete with evidence of open and closed practices—differently. Some courts 
have held that the experience prong is satisfied if the proceeding at issue has 
been predominantly open, even if there are instances in which it was closed, or 
if there are elements of openness in spite of other aspects indicating that the 
procedure is closed to the public. Other courts, in contrast, have cited examples 
in which the proceeding was closed to the public to demonstrate that the 
experience prong was not met, even if there was ample evidence of public access. 
 
 a. Mixed History Is Sufficient 
 
In Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, the Sixth Circuit relied on the general 
presumption and practice of open deportation hearings to satisfy the 
experience prong and did not give weight to the instances of closed 
deportation hearings the government cited to argue against a historical 
tradition of openness.120 On September 21, 2001, the chief immigration 
judge issued a directive to all federal immigration judges to close certain 
cases to the press and public, including deportation hearings.121 In 2002, the 
family of a man who was subject to deportation and members of the press 
and public, including Congressman John Conyers, were denied access to a 
deportation hearing.122 Journalists and Congressman Conyers filed 
complaints under the First Amendment and other constitutional and 
statutory provisions seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.123 The Sixth 
Circuit held that a First Amendment right of access attaches to deportation 
hearings.124 Analyzing the history of access to deportation hearings, the 
court found that, although at times deportation hearings may have been 
closed to the public, deportation hearings have generally been open.125 The 
 
119 Id. at 1244. 
120 303 F.3d 681, 700-03 (6th Cir. 2002). 
121 Id. at 684. 
122 Id. at 684-85. 
123 Id. at 685. 
124 Id. at 705. 
125 Id. at 701. 
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court noted that although Congress has repeatedly passed statutes closing 
exclusion hearings, no statute has ever required deportation hearings to be 
closed.126 Furthermore, since 1965, regulations promulgated by the United 
States Immigration and Naturalization Service have explicitly required 
deportation proceedings to be presumptively open.127 
How to construe mixed history also affects whether there is a First 
Amendment right of access to view executions. In 1996, California’s San 
Quentin prison instituted a policy whereby witnesses could not observe an 
inmate entering into an execution chamber and a prison employee strapping 
the inmate to the gurney and administering intravenous lines.128 Witnesses 
could only begin watching an execution after the inmate was sedated and 
lay motionless on the gurney before lethal drugs were administered.129 A 
coalition of journalists sued to enjoin the practice, and the Ninth Circuit 
held that the public has a First Amendment right to view the entirety of 
executions.130 Analyzing the experience prong, the court noted that 
historically executions in England and in the United States were held in 
public places and open to the public.131 When executions were moved from 
public locations into prisons, states instituted practices to allow executions 
to remain open to some public observation.132 California, for example, 
passed a law that a minimum of twelve people should be present at a private 
execution, and every state authorizing the death penalty requires official 
witnesses to observe each execution.133 Most states also allow journalists to 
attend executions.134 Given this history, the court held that even though 
executions are now held in prisons where the public does not have right of 
access, a First Amendment right of access to view executions extends from 
the time the inmate is escorted into the chamber.135 The Ninth Circuit 
articulated that while some features of executions—such as that they are 
conducted in prisons—suggest that they are private, other elements—such 
as allowing a few members of the public to view the events—are enough to 




128 Cal. First Amendment Coalition v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 2002). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 873. 
131 Id. at 875. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 876. 
135 Id. The holding and reasoning of California First Amendment Coalition was applied in another 
Ninth Circuit case, Associated Press v. Otter, 682 F.3d 821, 823 (9th Cir. 2012), and in district court 
cases in Arizona, Guardian News & Media LLC v. Ryan, 225 F. Supp. 3d 859, 868-69 (D. Ariz. 2016), 
and in Pennsylvania, Philadelphia Inquirer v. Wetzel, 906 F. Supp. 2d 362, 370 (M.D. Pa. 2012). 
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 b. Mixed History Is Not Sufficient 
 
Other courts have reviewed the same proceedings and history and have 
reached opposite conclusions regarding the experience prong. When 
presented with the identical issue as the Sixth Circuit in Detroit Free Press, the 
Third Circuit held that deportation hearings did not pass the experience 
prong because “the tradition of open deportation hearings is too recent and 
inconsistent to support a First Amendment right of access.”136 The court 
recognized that statutes and regulations create a presumption that 
deportation hearings are accessible to the public.137 But despite this 
presumption of openness, the court noted that deportation hearings are 
sometimes conducted in places where there is no general right of access, such 
as prisons, hospitals, or private homes.138 In addition, deportation hearings 
involving abused alien children are closed by regulation, irrespective of where 
they are held, and deportation hearings of abused alien spouses are closed 
presumptively.139 The court refuted the significance of Department of Justice 
regulations that created a presumption of openness by claiming that 
“regulatory presumption is hardly the stuff of which Constitutional rights are 
forged.”140 The Third Circuit in great detail distinguished the historical 
tradition of access to deportation hearings to the history of access to criminal 
trials in Richmond Newspapers to explain why it declined to hold that 
deportation hearings satisfied the experience prong. 
 We ultimately do not believe that deportation hearings boast a tradition 
of openness sufficient to satisfy Richmond Newspapers. In Richmond 
Newspapers itself, the Court noted an “unbroken, uncontradicted history” of 
public access to criminal trials in Anglo American law running from “before 
the Norman Conquest” to the present, and it emphasized that it had not 
found “a single instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera in any federal, 
state, or municipal court during the history of this country . . .” 
 
136 N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2002). This case prompted 
a strong dissent from Judge Scirica, who believed that the experience and logic test was satisfied. Id. 
at 222 (Scirica, J., dissenting). Judge Scirica wrote that the experience prong was met because 
“[d]eportation hearings have a consistent history of openness.” Id. When Congress first adopted 
immigrant statutes at the end of the nineteenth century, Congress expressly closed exclusion 
proceedings and left deportation hearings presumptively open. Id. Department of Justice 
regulations, promulgated in 1964, mandate that all hearings other than exclusion hearings shall be 
open to the public, subject to a few exceptions. Id. 
137 Id. at 211-12 (majority opinion). 
138 Id. at 212. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 213. 
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The tradition of open deportation hearings is simply not comparable. While 
the expressio unius distinction between exclusion and deportation proceedings is 
a tempting road to travel, we are unwilling effectively to craft a constitutional 
right from mere Congressional silence, especially when faced with evidence that 
some deportation proceedings were, and are, explicitly closed to the public or 
conducted in places unlikely to allow general public access.141 
Unlike the Sixth Circuit, the Third Circuit emphasized instances in which 
deportation hearings are closed, and minimized the statutory and regulatory 
presumptions of openness, to hold that the experience prong was not met. 
Just as the Third Circuit approached the mixed history of deportation 
hearings differently than the Sixth Circuit, district courts in Oklahoma and 
Arkansas reached a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Ninth Circuit 
in California First Amendment Coalition.142 An Oklahoma district court claimed 
that the fact that executions in Oklahoma are conducted in private and that in 
1890, the Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota statute that required executions 
to be conducted before sunrise, in a jail, or in a private enclosed area out of 
public view, with a limited number of people present, demonstrated that the 
history of public viewings of executions “is not the same ‘unbroken, 
uncontradicted history’ of access that the Supreme Court found persuasive in 
Richmond and its progeny.”143 Similarly, the Arkansas district court claimed 
that unlike “the unbroken, uncontradicted history of public access to criminal 
trials,” executions in the United States became private events in the early 1800s 
when they were moved from the public square and into prisons.144 Since 1887, 
Arkansas law dictated that executions in the state are private, and the court 
held that the fact that six to twelve people may watch an execution does not 
“transform a private execution into a public proceeding.”145 In these cases, 
courts held that the limited public access to executions does not mitigate the 
private elements of executions codified in statutes.146 
 
141 Id. at 212-13. 
142 See Okla. Observer v. Patton, 73 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1325 (D. Okla. 2014). 
143 Id. 
144 Ark. Times, Inc. v. Norris, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3500, at *12 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 7, 2008). 
145 Id. at *13. 
146 The question about how to construe mixed history also affects whether there is a First 
Amendment right of access to information about lethal injections. In Georgia, an inmate on death row 
challenged the constitutionality of Georgia’s execution-participant confidentiality statute, which classifies 
information about people and entities that participate in executions as “confidential state secret[s].” 
Owens v. Hill, 295 Ga. 302, 303 (2014). The Georgia Supreme Court ruled that the inmate had did not 
have a First Amendment right to receive information about his execution. Id. at 316-17. Applying the 
experience and logic test, the court held that although there has been a tradition of allowing some public 
access to execution proceedings, the fact that there is a longstanding tradition of concealing the identities 
of people who carry out executions is enough to fail the experience prong. Id. The Ninth Circuit reached 
the opposite conclusion in Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir.), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 21 (2014). The Ninth 
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PG Publishing Co. v. Alchele, a Third Circuit case involving access to 
polling sites, also involved mixed history, although in this case, the court 
addressed the history of a proceeding that initially was public and did not 
retain public elements when it became private over time.147 A trade group 
representing media outlets in Pennsylvania challenged a Pennsylvania statute, 
passed in 1937, that required all people, except voters, election officials, and 
police officers, to remain at least ten feet away from a polling place during 
voting.148 The group claimed that the law infringed their First Amendment 
right to access and gather news at polling places.149 Assessing the history of 
public access to polling sites, the court noted that in the colonial period, 
voting was conducted by voice vote, a process that was freely accessible to the 
public.150 Newly formed states then used paper ballots, and voters crafted 
ballots at home and cast them at polling sites.151 In the late 1800s, states 
abandoned this method and adopted the Australian system of voting, in which 
candidates’ names were placed on a single ballot and citizens cast their votes 
in polling booths.152 By 1896, about ninety percent of states had adopted the 
Australian method.153 Accordingly, the court concluded that “[w]hile the act 
of voting—and the process by which voting was carried out—began its life as 
a public affair, our Nation’s history demonstrates a decided and long-standing 
trend away from openness, toward a closed electoral process.”154 As such, the 
court held that the “historical record is insufficient to establish a presumption 
of openness in the context of the voting process.”155 Reviewing these cases 
 
Circuit held that the fact that executions historically have been open to the public and that some states 
have provided the public with information about lethal injection drug protocols is sufficient to satisfy 
the experience prong at the preliminary injunction stage. Id. at 1083-84. 
147 705 F.3d 91, 108-10 (3d Cir. 2013). 
148 Id. at 95. 
149 Id. at 95, 98. 
150 Id. at 109. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 110. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. In 2004, the Sixth Circuit also addressed whether denying access to polling sites in 
accordance with an Ohio statute violates the First Amendment. Beacon Journal Publ’g Co., Inc. v. 
Blackwell, 389 F.3d 683, 684 (6th Cir. 2004) The Sixth Circuit held that the First Amendment was 
violated and ordered journalists “to have reasonable access to any polling place for the purpose of news-
gathering and reporting so long as [they] do not interfere with poll workers and voters.” Id. at 685. 
Unlike the Third Circuit PG Publishing Co., the Sixth Circuit analyzed this question under the public 
forum doctrine. Id. Under the public forum doctrine, for a state to “enforce a content-based exclusion” 
“in places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate,” 
the state “must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is 
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 
45-46 (1983). The Third Circuit strongly criticized the Sixth Circuit’s application of the public forum 
doctrine. PG Publ’g Co., 705 F.2d at 113. First, the Third Circuit maintained that, under Supreme Court 
and Third Circuit precedents, polling places are not public forum. Id. As such, it maintained that 
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demonstrates two different ways courts construe historical traditions that 
include public and private elements when applying the experience prong. 
 
6. Rejecting Historical Analysis Altogether 
 
In cases in which there is a paucity of history, some courts have 
sidestepped the experience prong altogether and have exclusively analyzed 
whether the logic prong justified a First Amendment right of access. Three 
federal criminal cases illustrate this approach.156 
In United States v. Suarez, a Connecticut newspaper petitioned a district 
court to intervene in an armed robbery case to request access to sealed records 
of payments the defendants made under the Criminal Justice Act.157 The 
district court granted the newspapers’ motion, and the defendants 
appealed.158 The Second Circuit acknowledged that there is no long tradition 
of accessibility to forms required by the Criminal Justice Act because the 
statute, enacted in 1964, is a fairly recent development.159 Nonetheless, it 
relied on the strength of the logic prong to recognize a First Amendment 
right of access to the documents. “The lack of ‘tradition’ with respect to the 
[Criminal Justice Act] forms does not detract from the public’s strong interest 
in how its funds are being spent in the administration of criminal justice,” the 
court found.160 Accordingly, it recognized a First Amendment right of access 
to the documents sought “[b]ecause there is no persuasive reason to ignore 
 
“adopting a traditional forum analysis for cases such as the one at bar sets a dangerous precedent which 
permits the government too much freedom to hide their activities from the public’s view” because the 
government would only have to satisfy a reasonableness standard for a ban on access to be upheld. Id. 
But the Third Circuit maintained that the public forum doctrine is not appropriate to decide this issue 
because the doctrine involves the regulation of expressions that take place on or seek access to public 
property, while the access to polling sites at issue in the case involves access to “a government 
proceeding for news-gathering purposes.” Id. The right of access doctrine does not involve the 
regulation of expressions—it involves the right to be present, to observe and to obtain information. 
156 For other cases that have adopted this approach, see, e.g., United States v. DeJournett, 817 
F.3d 479, 484-85 (6th Cir. 2016) (recognizing a constitutional right of access to plea agreements 
because “plea agreements play a central role in our criminal justice system” and access “plays a 
significant role in monitoring the administration of justice by plea” and not addressing the 
experience prong); In re Copay Press, Inc., 518 F.3d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir. 2008) (acknowledging that 
there is no history of access to a hearing on a motion to seal because the proceeding is relatively 
new, as it was created by the Ninth Circuit twenty-five years prior, but holding that a First 
Amendment right of access attaches to the transcript of the hearing nonetheless because the hearings 
were created “to give the public an opportunity to be heard,” and recognizing a right of access to a 
plea colloquy transcript on the basis of the logic prong alone). 
157 880 F.2d 626, 627-28 (2d Cir. 1989). 
158 Id. at 628. 
159 Id. at 631. 
160 Id. 
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the presumption of openness that applies to documents submitted in 
connection with a criminal proceeding.161 
The Second Circuit’s rejection of the experience prong in this case is of 
particular interest because, as previously discussed, the Tenth Circuit relied 
on the relative recent passage of the Criminal Justice Act to find that there 
was no history of access to documents filed under the act and to reject a First 
Amendment right of access in United States v. Gonzales.162 
Similarly, in United States v. Simone, the Third Circuit recognized a First 
Amendment right of access to post-trial examinations of a jury, even though 
the court acknowledged that there is no “rich historical tradition” of access to 
post-trial examinations of jury misconduct.163 In constructing the history of 
access to post-trial examinations of jury misconduct, the plaintiff only cited 
three Florida state court cases from after 1980.164 Accordingly, the court held 
that the experience prong is not instructive in this case, and relied solely on 
the logic prong to recognize the right, partly because of the “overwhelming 
historical support for access in other phases of the criminal process . . . .”165 
Lastly, the Fifth Circuit was presented with the question of whether the 
public has a First Amendment right of access to bail reduction hearings after 
journalists challenged an order of a magistrate judge closing a bail reduction 
hearing of a man indicted for killing a federal judge in 1979.166 The court 
acknowledged that there is no “unbroken, uncontradicted history” of public 
bond hearings because they are not always conducted in open court, and bond 
amounts may be fixed at the police station, during telephone conversations or in 
chambers.167 But the court held that “[b]ecause the [F]irst [A]mendment must 
be interpreted in the context of current values and conditions, the lack of an 
historic tradition of open bail reduction hearings does not bar our recognizing a 
right of access to such hearings.”168 Instead, the court claimed that the 
justifications for the First Amendment right of access articulated in the 
Supreme Court cases are implicated in bail processes, which compelled the court 
to recognize a First Amendment right of access.169 Thus, some lower courts 
recognize that the experience prong is not instructive when evaluating access to 
 
161 Id. 
162 See supra text accompanying notes 91–93. 
163 14 F.3d 833, 837 (3d Cir. 1994). 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 838. 
166 United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 355-57, 360 (1983); see also Seattle Times Co. v. U.S. 
Dist. Court for the W. Dist. Of Wash., 845 F.2d 1513, 1516-17 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the lack 
of a history of open pretrial detention bail proceedings should not automatically foreclose a right of 
access and recognizing a right of access because of the importance of bail proceedings). 
167 Chagra, 701 F.2d at 362-63. 
168 Id. at 363 (internal citations omitted). 
169 Id. 
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proceedings that lack a historical tradition of openness, and in turn have entirely 
relied on the logic prong when applying the experience and logic test. 
 
7. Analogous Historical Inquiry 
 
Some courts have compared relatively recent proceedings, which are too 
new to have historical traditions of access, to older proceedings with such 
histories to satisfy the experience prong. Three cases illustrate this approach.170 
When a police officer in New York City issues a citation for a violation of transit 
bureau rules, he issues a summons, either to criminal court or to an 
administrative proceeding in which the person may contest the citation in an 
in-person hearing.171 The proceedings in criminal court are open to the public, 
but the person contesting the violation may exclude an individual from the 
administrative proceeding.172 In 2012, the New York Civil Liberties Union filed 
a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that the policy violated the First 
Amendment right of access to government proceedings, and the district court 
granted an order enjoining the policy, which the transit authority appealed.173 
Analyzing the history of access to the particular administrative proceeding, the 
Second Circuit maintained that the proceeding is analogous to a criminal trial 
because the Transit Authority Bureau “acts as an adjudicatory body, operates 
under procedures modeled on those of the courts,” and because the two 
proceedings are “functionally comparable” as either the Criminal Court or the 
Transit Authority Bureau has jurisdiction.174 The Second Circuit elaborated 
why it is appropriate to analogize to other proceedings. 
 
170 For other cases adopting this approach, see In re Cincinnati Enquirer, 94 F.3d 198, 199 (6th   
Cir. 1996) (holding that the experience prong was not met because a summary jury trial proceeding 
is “essentially a settlement proceeding,” which is historically closed, because a summary jury trial 
“does not present any matter for adjudication by the court, but functions to facilitate settlement”); 
In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 630 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2009) (comparing the history 
of access to habeas proceedings to civil proceedings because a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is 
a form of civil litigation, and concluding that because “there has been a history of public access to 
civil proceedings . . . access to habeas proceedings has been historically available,” even though there 
is virtually no case law on whether habeas proceedings have historically been open to the public); 
Soc’y of Prof ’l Journalists v. Sec’y of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569, 575 (D. Utah 1985) (acknowledging 
that there is little historical tradition of public access to administrative fact-finding hearings, in part 
because they are of recent origin, but holding that the experience prong was satisfied nonetheless 
because congressional sessions have been open to the public “since the early history of our country” 
and because civil trials, which are “analogous to administrative fact-finding proceedings,” have 
historically been accessible to the public). 
171 N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 289 (2d Cir. 2011). 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 300-01. 
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[W]idespread administrative adjudication is a relatively new phenomenon. But 
changes in the organization of government do not exempt new institutions from 
the purview of old rules. Rather, they lead us to ask how the new institutions fit 
into existing legal structures. If, as the NYCTA suggests, government 
institutions that did not exist at the time of the Framers were insulated from the 
principles of accountability and public participation that the Framers inscribed 
in the First Amendment, legislatures could easily avoid constitutional strictures 
by moving an old governmental function to a new institutional location. 
Immunizing government proceedings from public scrutiny by placing them in 
institutions the Framers could not have imagined, as the NYCTA urges, would 
make avoidance of constitutional protections all too easy.175 
The court recognized that it would be problematic if new proceedings 
were immunized from constitutional scrutiny solely because they are new. 
But given the right of access doctrine’s emphasis on history, the court found 
a way for the “new institution” of administrative proceedings contesting 
traffic violations to “fit into existing legal structures” by comparing 
administrative proceedings to criminal trials.176 
In Delaware Coalition for Open Government, Inc. v. Strine, the Third Circuit 
adopted a “broad historical approach” and evaluated the history of access to 
both arbitration proceedings and civil trials.177 The case revolved around public 
access to the Delaware Court of Chancery’s arbitration program, which serves 
as an alternative to trial for some disputes.178 According to the statutes and rules 
governing the proceedings, arbitration petitions are confidential and are not 
included in the court’s public docketing system, only parties to the arbitration 
and their representatives may attend, and all materials produced during the 
arbitration are protected from disclosure.179 A watchdog group argued that the 
confidentiality of the program violated the First Amendment.180 In evaluating 
the watchdog group’s claim, the Third Circuit separately analyzed the history 
of access to arbitration proceedings and to civil trials. It noted that civil trials 
are generally open to the public, while arbitration proceedings have a “mixed 
record of openness” because modern arbitrations are generally private, although 
in some jurisdictions alternative dispute resolution proceedings supplement 
civil litigation and are public.181 Nonetheless, the court held that “[t]aking the 
private nature of many arbitrations into account, the history of civil trials and 
 
175 Id. at 299 (citation omitted). 
176 Id. 
177 733 F.3d 510, 515-18 (3d Cir. 2013). 
178 Id. at 512. 
179 Id. at 513. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 516-18. 
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arbitrations demonstrates a strong tradition of openness for . . . Delaware’s 
government-sponsored arbitrations” because of similarities between civil 
litigation and the Delaware program.182 In particular, the court justified the 
analogy because of the similarities between the two proceedings—including 
that active judges preside over arbitration proceedings in a courthouse, and that 
the arbitrations “result in a binding order of the Chancery Court, and . . . allow 
only a limited right of appeal.”183 Even though the Third Circuit analyzed the 
histories of arbitration proceedings and civil trials, its conclusion that the 
experience prong was met rested largely on the similarities between the 
Delaware arbitration program and civil proceedings. 
Analogous reasoning also was a basis for the Sixth Circuit’s determination 
in Detroit Free Press that the experience prong was satisfied, although it was 
less central to the court’s conclusion than in the other cases discussed.184 In 
addition to focusing on the history of deportation hearings, the court 
compared deportation hearings to the sentencing phase of a trial.185 
Deportation hearings, the court noted, “‘walk, talk, and squawk,’ very much 
like a judicial proceeding.”186 The court held that the long-standing history of 
openness to trials is instructive because “the only other federal court that can 
enter an order of removal is a United States District Court during sentencing 
in a criminal trial.”187 Thus, in some cases, analogous reasoning forms the 
primary basis for courts’ determination on the experience prong, while in 
other cases, the use of analogies complements courts’ consideration of the 
history of access to particular proceedings. 
 
8. Not Deciding the First Amendment Question Because Closure Was Justified 
 
Lastly, some courts have not decided whether a First Amendment right 
of access attaches to a particular proceeding. Instead they have resolved the 
questions presented by claiming that a supposed right of access would not 
survive strict scrutiny. Two cases illustrate this approach.188 In American Civil 
Liberties Union v. Holder, the American Civil Liberties Union and other 
watchdog groups challenged the False Claims Act’s requirement that qui tam 
 
182 Id. at 518. 
183 Id. 




188 For another case that adopts this approach, see United States v. Brice, 649 F.3d 793, 796 
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (declining to decide whether there is a First Amendment right of access to material 
witness proceedings because a supposed right would be overcome because in the case at issue closure 
served a compelling interest, there was a substantial probability that the compelling interest would 
be harmed in the absence of closure, and there were no alternatives to closure). 
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complaints must be filed under seal and remain sealed for sixty days.189 The 
appellants argued that the seal provision violated the public’s First 
Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings and also raised a First 
Amendment prior restraint challenge.190 The Fourth Circuit declined to 
address whether the First Amendment right of access extends to qui tam 
complaints and docket sheets sealed in accordance with the False Claims 
Act.191 Instead, it held that a supposed right of access would be overcome by 
the government’s compelling interest in “protecting the integrity of ongoing 
fraud investigations” and because the seal provisions are narrowly tailored to 
serve the compelling governmental interest.192 In support of its deflection of 
the constitutional question, the court cited Pearson v. Callahan for the 
proposition that “lower federal courts should not ‘pass on questions of 
constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable.’”193 
Similarly, in Webster Groves School District v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., the 
Pulitzer Publishing Company intervened to gain access to court records filed 
under seal in a lawsuit against a school district following an incident in which 
a handicapped child threatened a classmate with a loaded handgun.194 At the 
time of the case in 1990, the Eighth Circuit had not yet ruled whether the First 
Amendment right of access applied to civil proceedings or court files in civil 
lawsuit.195 The court declined to decide these question.196 Instead, it held that 
in the particular case, the minor’s privacy interest and the state’s interest in 
protecting minors from the dissemination of hurtful information overcame the 
publishing company’s supposed right to access the records because the records 
included information about the child’s disability and educational records.197 In 
these cases, courts did not decide whether a First Amendment right of access 
attached, and instead analyzed whether denying access is justified. 
Accordingly, careful review of the case law demonstrates eight different 
ways courts apply the experience prong. They differ most with regards to how 
to construe the history of new proceedings, ones that lack a lengthy history 
of access, and ones with mixed, ambiguous histories of openness. 
 
189 673 F.3d 245, 247 (4th Cir. 2011). 
190 Id. at 247. 
191 Id. at 252. 
192 Id. at 252-53. 
193 Id. at 252. 
194 898 F.2d 1371, 1373 (8th Cir. 1990). 
195 Id. at 1374, 1377. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 1375, 1377. 
1590 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 1561 
III. REASONS FOR AND AGAINST RELYING ON HISTORY TO     
        RECOGNIZE A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS 
Before I analyze these taxonomies, it is important to distill why, according 
to the Supreme Court, lower courts, and scholars, history is a basis for a 
constitutional right of access, as well as various drawbacks of relying on 
history to justify a constitutional right. 
A. Why Is History Relevant? 
Richmond Newspapers articulated a few reasons why a historical tradition 
is relevant to support a constitutional right of access. Justice Brennan’s 
concurrence in Richmond Newspapers offered two explanations.198 First, Justice 
Brennan wrote that “tradition commands respect in part because the 
Constitution carries the gloss of history.”199 Historical context shaped the 
drafting of the Constitution and in turn informs its meaning. Second, Justice 
Brennan continued that “a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable 
judgment of experience.”200 In other words, “tradition deserves deference 
because a historical practice reflects collective judgment over time that the 
particular practice is useful or beneficial.”201 
Chief Justice Burger’s plurality opinion did not elaborate in detail why a 
historical tradition should support a constitutional right of access, but echoing 
Justice Brennan’s first argument, he wrote that the “Bill of Rights was enacted 
against the backdrop of the long history of trials being presumptively 
open.”202 Professor Catherine McCauliff explained that the use of history in 
this context “indicated the Court’s respect for long standing customs that 
continue to function well” and that “the constitutionalization of the open trial 
did not establish an unwarranted departure from custom itself.”203 However, 
Press-Enterprise II’s reliance on history from the early nineteenth century 
through the twentieth century to justify a right of access to preliminary 
hearings forecloses the possibility that a historical tradition of access from the 
framing of the Constitution is required. Press-Enterprise II’s historical 
construction also negates the arguments that history is a basis for a 
 
198 Id. at 584-98 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
199 Id. at 589. 
200 Id. 
201 First Amendment—Public Access to Deportation Hearings—Third Circuit Holds That the 
Government Can Close “Special Interest” Deportation Hearings, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1198 (2003) 
[hereinafter First Amendment—Public Access to Deportation Hearings]. 
202 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575. 
203 C.M.A. McCauliff, Constitutional Jurisprudence of History and Natural Law: Complementary 
or Rival Modes of Discourse?, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 287, 314 (1987). 
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constitutional right of access because it represents the original intent of the 
Framers and is necessary to provide an originalist constraint on judges.204 
In addition, Chief Justice Burger grounded the right of access in the First 
Amendment in part because the First Amendment is intended to “prohibit 
[the] government from limiting the stock of information from which 
members of the public may draw.”205 Accordingly, it is logical to look to 
history and to argue that the government cannot close “court proceedings that 
have long been open to the public.”206 
In an opinion authored as a D.C. Circuit judge, then-Judge Scalia offered an 
additional explanation as to why history is important to recognize a First 
Amendment right of access. Judge Scalia wrote that a “historical tradition of at 
least some duration is obviously necessary” because “[w]ith neither the constraint 
of text nor the constraint of historical practice, nothing would separate the 
judicial task of constitutional interpretation from the political task of enacting 
laws currently deemed essential.”207 Judge Scalia was wary of courts legislating 
from the bench and claimed that recognizing a right based on a history of access 
shifts judges’ roles from creating new rights to enforcing existing norms. This 
explanation was cited by some subsequent lower court opinions deciding whether 
a First Amendment right of access attaches to a particular proceeding.208 
The Supreme Court cases do not address challenges posed by relying on 
history to recognize a First Amendment right of access, what sorts of 
historical traditions are sufficient to satisfy the experience prong, or how to 
apply the test when evaluating proceedings that do not have as lengthy, 
continuous, or old a history of access as criminal proceedings. This absence is 
not surprising given the extensive history of access to criminal trials on which 
the Supreme Court relied and the limited contexts in which the Supreme 
Court has subsequently applied the experience and logic test. 
B. Why Not Rely on History? 
A circuit case and scholars provide multiple reasons why a historical 
tradition should not be required to recognize a constitutional right of access. 
Although most lower courts apply the experience and logic test without 
justifying their historical construction, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. 
 
204 See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 700 (6th Cir. 2002) (maintaining that Press-
Enterprise II’s exclusive reliance on “post-Bill of Rights history in determining that preliminary hearings in 
criminal cases were historically open” “effectively silenced” the argument that a party must show that a 
tradition of access existed at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights to satisfy the experience prong). 
205 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576. 
206 Ardia, supra note 16, at 863. 
207 In re Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
208 See, e.g., Dhiab v. Trump, 852 F.3d 1087, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 2017); N.Y. Civil Liberties Union 
v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 289, 301 n.11 (2d Cir. 2012); Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 701. 
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Chagra argued that historical practice should not be necessary to recognize 
a First Amendment right of access because the Supreme Court has 
articulated that “the [F]irst [A]mendment must be interpreted in the 
context of current values and conditions.”209 According to this perspective, 
current values, norms and ethos should inform the meeting of the First 
Amendment—not only historical antecedents. 
Scholars evaluating the experience and logic test fill in gaps not addressed 
by the Supreme Court and lower court opinions. They offer multiple reasons 
why history is not a sound basis for recognizing a First Amendment right of 
access. First, relying on history does not account for changes in the judicial 
system and practices. This is relevant in two respects. In cases where the 
reasons for openness in the past have disappeared, then a “tradition of access 
may not truly ‘imply the favorable judgment of experience’ . . . .”210 This is 
illustrated by two examples. Judge Kimba Wood questioned why the history 
of voir dire proceedings from the seventeenth and early eighteenth century 
should inform access to jury selection in the twentieth century when the two 
proceedings dramatically differ.211 Two hundred years ago, Judge Wood 
argued, there was less concern about the effect of pretrial publicity and jurors’ 
privacy interests, and less need to “ask questions of the type necessary to ferret 
out strangers’ biases.”212 But, judges today must ask such “questions—but 
many jurors are too embarrassed to answer them candidly in open court.”213 
Thus, “[t]he Court’s emphasis on the historical openness of voir dire, divorced 
from its context, has led lower courts to favor openness at the expense of 
developing information . . . to pick a fair jury.”214 In addition, during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the time period Richmond Newspapers 
relied upon to chart the history of open trials, criminal defendants had fewer 
procedural protections, like the right to counsel.215 As a result, the open trial 
rule then both benefitted the public and defendants.216 But with increased 
procedural protections, “the defendant and her attorney [can] play a much 
larger role in maintaining the integrity of the judicial system—a function 
previously relegated primarily to the public. The historical argument for 
openness takes inadequate account of this shift.”217 
 
209 Chagra, 701 F.2d at 363; see also sources cited supra notes 161–164. 
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Second, requiring a historical tradition to recognize a constitutional right 
of access precludes new practices or procedures that lack a history of access 
from being subject to constitutional protection.218 This is especially relevant 
because the judicial system is constantly evolving, public trials in criminal 
cases have largely been replaced by charge and plea bargaining, which mainly 
take place in private, and judges do much of their work off of the bench.219 In 
other words, “When we make history determinative of future rights of access, 
we lock in a static set of practices that may have little to do with the First 
Amendment justifications for public access in the first place.”220 
Furthermore, relying on history is fraught because “history often appears 
equivocal: [p]ractices in the past were not as uniform as one Justice or another 
occasionally has claimed.”221 “Events recorded in history may be recorded not 
because they are typical, but, in some cases, because they are atypical or 
sensational.”222 As a result, basing a right on history raises evidentiary questions: 
how long and continuous must a history be to satisfy the experience prong? 
“What kind of history counts,” and how unequivocal must the history be?223 
In addition, some scholars have argued that relying on history as a condition 
for a right of access does not logically mean that the absence of history should 
foreclose the right.224 In other words, “a lack of tradition does not prove that a 
practice has no utility, or else new traditions would never take root.”225 
Some scholars have also questioned the narrowness of courts’ historical 
inquiry. An article in the Harvard Law Review reviewing recent circuit cases 
argued that “[c]ourts should consider not only the facts of a proceeding’s history 
but also the normative implications of that history in deciding whether to find a 
public right of access.”226 In particular, the article critiqued PG Publishing Co., in 
which the Third Circuit reviewed the history of access to polling sites and voting 
but “did not consider the long history of racial discrimination and 
disenfranchisement that has accompanied the closed polling process.”227 The 
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article continued that “[i]t was not until these racially discriminatory laws received 
widespread media coverage that Congress was spurred to action, enacting the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965.”228 By not evaluating the normative implications of 
history, courts “risk denying public access to those proceedings that could most 
benefit from the sunlight effects of public discussion and scrutiny.”229 
Lastly, some scholars have also critiqued the use of history in this line of 
cases because of the inconsistent ways in which lower courts apply the 
experience prong. While this objection could be remedied, it is important to 
recognize the problems posed by inconsistency in judicial decisionmaking. 
“[C]onsistency in decision-making enhances the actuality and appearance of 
fairness[,] . . . ensures that similar cases are and appear to be treated similarly” 
and increases predictability.230 “Inconsistent decisions give rise to suspicions 
that the courts’ analyses are outcome-driven.”231 
Thus, while lower courts are largely silent about the problems posed by 
relying on history to recognize a First Amendment right of access, scholars 
critique the centrality of history in this doctrine for four primary reasons: the 
ways in which the historical inquiry does not account for changes in 
government, the evidentiary issues it poses, the narrowness of the history 
inquiry, and the inconsistent application of the experience prong. 
IV. ANALYZING WHETHER THE TAXONOMIES ARE IN LINE  
WITH OR DEPART FROM THE SUPREME COURT’S  
CONSTRUCTION AND REASONING 
After charting lower courts’ different applications of the experience prong 
and surveying reasons for and against the use of history in recognizing a right of 
access under the First Amendment, it is now possible to analyze how the different 
approaches are in line with or depart from the Supreme Court’s reasoning. 
 
1. Faithful to the Supreme Court’s Experience Prong 
 
At first glance, lower courts’ faithfulness to the experience prong 
undermines scholars’ critiques of the doctrine as many lower courts appear 
not to suggest that the current experience prong is unworkable. But the fact 
that many of the cases in which courts found no history of access involved 
new laws, proceedings or documents, including laws passed in 1964 and 1986, 
and procedures promulgated in 1991, underscores critiques that the test’s 
reliance on history is not well suited to address changes and innovations in 
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judicial and governmental practices. This is especially troublesome given that 
the justifications for a right of access to criminal trials articulated in Richmond 
Newspapers—including increasing confidence in the administration of justice 
and informing the public about the works of government—are applicable to 
areas of government outside of the judicial system and because of the 
importance of the First Amendment to “assur[e] freedom of communication 
on matters relating to the functioning of government.”232 Additionally, 
highlighting that lower courts chart a history of access most similar to those 
in the Supreme Court cases in situations involving access to different parts 
of the judicial system strengthens the question whether the experience prong 
is applicable to scenarios outside of the judicial context. 
 
2. Framing-Era History 
 
Press-Enterprise II’s historical survey of access to preliminary hearings 
from the early nineteenth century through the twentieth century effectively 
silenced the argument that Framing-era history is required and that a 
historical tradition is a basis for a right of access because it demonstrates the 
intent of the Framers.233 Accordingly, it is not surprising that none of the 
circuit case law surveyed required Framing-era history to satisfy the 
experience prong. But this approach is still important when analyzing the 
experience prong because in the cases surveyed, some defendants argued that 
under Richmond Newspapers, Framing-era history is required—an argument 
that the federal case law has emphatically rejected.234 
 
3. State Statutes 
 
Relying on the passage of state statutes to satisfy the experience prong is 
in line with the two main reasons for why history is relevant. The fact that 
state legislatures deliberated and passed laws guaranteeing access in the 
particular contexts, and that the laws continue to be in effect “reflects 
collective judgment over time that the particular practice is useful or 
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beneficial.”235 In addition, relying on state statutes does not require judges to 
make policy decisions or decide whether to create a new practice. 
However, the historical constructions in the cases that rely on state statutes 
to satisfy the experience prong are narrower than the historical constructions 
in the Supreme Court cases. The laws guaranteeing access to township 
planning commission meetings, at issue in Whiteland Woods, were only passed 
in 1968 and 1986, and some of the state laws granting access to voter lists, cited 
in Cal-Almond, were only passed in 1969 and 1970. This analysis thus 
demonstrates that narrower historical traditions than those in the Supreme 
Court cases can be in line with the reasoning of, and justifications provided 
by, the Supreme Court cases on the First Amendment right of access. 
In addition, emphasizing the recent passage of these laws is critical 
because it underscores the different ways courts construe modern laws and 
recent practices when applying the experience prong. While laws passed in 
the last half of the twentieth century were sufficient in Whiteland Woods and 
Cal-Almond to satisfy the experience prong, other courts, as previously 
discussed, maintained that the passage of laws in 1964, at issue in El-Sayegh, 
and in 1986, at issue in In re U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 
2703(d), for example, were too recent to have developed any history or 
tradition of public access. The laws in Whiteland Woods and Cal-Almond can 
be distinguished from the Criminal Justice Act, at issue in El-Sayegh, and the 
Stored Communications Act, at issue in In re U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. Section 2703(d), because the laws in the former cases explicitly grant 
public access, while the latter laws do not. But the comparison nonetheless 
highlights the different ways courts construe recent laws and developments 
when applying the experience prong. 
 
4. Recent History and Practices 
 
Like the usage of state statutes, relying on recent history and practices to 
satisfy the experience prong is in line with the justifications for why history 
is relevant to recognize a right of access. The fact that courts have found prior 
patterns of access suggests that there has been some judgment or consensus 
that access in the particular context is positive and. In addition, finding 
precedent in historical practice—even recent or narrow ones—limits a judge’s 
need to create policy or new practices. 
However, although the lower court opinions adopting this approach do not 
acknowledge it, relying on recent history and practices to satisfy the 
experience prong affirms many of the problems articulated by scholars with 
basing a right of access on a historical tradition. For example, the timespan of 
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the historical inquiry affects a court’s conclusion. In Erie County, for example, 
the Second Circuit relied on the fact that monitor reports in four recent cases 
were accessible to the public to find a tradition of access,236 but if the timespan 
was broader and included additional cases, then the court may have reached a 
different conclusion. Similarly, in Applications of National Broadcasting Co., the 
court held that the experience prong was satisfied because reviewing Sixth 
Circuit cases over a sixty-year period, it found no case involving the 
disqualification of judges in which the proceedings were closed or the records 
were sealed.237 But had the court broadened its inquiry to include other courts 
or to cover a longer duration, it may have arrived at a different result. The 
Supreme Court cases give no direction as to how lengthy, continuous or strong 
a historical tradition of access must be. Thus, although relying on recent 
history and practices to satisfy the experience prong is in line with the reasons 
why history is relevant to recognize a constitutional right of access, the use of 
history in this context raises other interpretative questions. 
 
5. Mixed History 
 
As outlined previously, courts construe mixed history in two different 
ways, and I must analyze each approach. The construction of history by the 
Sixth Circuit in Detroit Free Press and by the Ninth Circuit in California First 
Amendment Coalition resemble the Supreme Court’s construction of history 
in Press-Enterprise II. Like Press-Enterprise II, these circuit court opinions 
acknowledge that some historical evidence demonstrates a history of access 
to deportation hearings and executions, while other evidence suggests that 
the proceedings are not open to the public. This approach reinforces Justice 
Brennan’s “favorable judgment of experience” argument because the courts 
find, overtime, an overall pattern of access. Like in the taxonomies involving 
state statutes and recent history and practices, this suggests that a 
longstanding, unanimous history of access, as was demonstrated in Richmond 
Newspapers, is not needed to demonstrate “collective judgment over time that 
the particular practice is useful or beneficial.”238 
However, comparing the construction of history in the execution cases to 
Press-Enterprise II raises another question. In Press-Enterprise II, the constructions 
of history suggested that access to preliminary hearings was “more open” than 
“closed,” that assessing the historical evidence as a whole indicated that there 
 
236 United States v. Erie County, N.Y., 763 F.3d 235, 241-42 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Second, NYCLU 
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was greater evidence of public access than restricted access to the particular 
proceeding. But is the same true for executions? Must the analysis be so granular, 
and what point does a mixed history tilt more towards being closed than being 
opened? The Supreme Court cases do not help answer these questions. 
Some of the opinions that maintain that mixed history is not sufficient to 
satisfy the experience prong, including the Third Circuit in North Jersey Media 
Group and Arkansas and Oklahoma district courts in cases involving access to 
executions, argue that the respective histories of access do not satisfy the 
experience prong because they are not “unbroken” and “uncontradicted.”239 By 
focusing on the language of Richmond Newspapers and its historical 
construction in particular, these opinions suggest that the Supreme Court 
requires an “unbroken, uncontradicted” history of access to satisfy the 
experience prong. While it is important to differentiate between the respective 
histories of access to criminal trials and deportation hearings and executions, 
courts’ appeals to the “unbroken” and “uncontradicted” language in Richmond 
Newspapers suggest insufficient recognition of the differences between the 
historical constructions in Press-Enterprise II and in the prior three Supreme 
Court cases. Press-Enterprise II presents a more nuanced historical survey than 
the other Supreme Court cases, as the majority opinion acknowledges that the 
history of access to preliminary hearings is not monolithic, but is characterized 
by a general presumption of openness, in spite of examples in which such 
proceedings have been closed. The cases that argue that mixed history is not 
sufficient latch onto the language of Richmond Newspapers, but do not give 
sufficient credence to the subsequent Supreme Court cases that demonstrate 
that uniformity in practice is not required to satisfy the experience prong. 
Because the Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise II did not explicitly articulate 
that it was departing from the prior Supreme Court cases’ historical 
constructions, and because the Court in Globe Newspaper did not acknowledge 
that there was evidence that trials involving minor victims of sexual assault 
were closed, this absence allowed some lower court opinions to largely focus 
on the historical construction in Richmond Newspaper and to underappreciate 
the application of the experience prong in Press-Enterprise II. 
Additionally, PG Publishing Co. raises important unaddressed questions 
about in what contexts a proceeding can lose its First Amendment right of 
access, given that voting was initially conducted in public but overtime 
became a private activity. While PG Publishing Co. was the only case I 
reviewed that dealt with the history of a proceeding that lost its public 
elements when it became private, this question may become more salient as 
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court-like and other governmental proceedings increasingly move out of the 
public sphere and assume more private dimensions.240 
 
6. Rejecting Historical Analysis Altogether 
 
Courts’ rejection of the experience prong departs from the two main 
reasons offered why history is relevant to recognize a First Amendment right 
of access and repudiates a defining feature of the First Amendment right of 
access doctrine. This approach challenges Judge Scalia’s view that relying on 
a historical tradition precludes judges from legislating from the bench. Justice 
Brennan’s “favorable judgment of experience” justification is not instructive 
when there is no history. Justice Brennan wrote that a “case for a right of 
access has special force when drawn from an enduring and vital tradition of 
public entree to a particular proceedings or information,”241 but this 
perspective gives little direction as to whether a right of access should be 
recognized when such a history is lacking. 
This approach is problematic, however, not only because of its divergence 
from Supreme Court precedents on the First Amendment right of access, but 
because of the diverging case law it generates as courts differ about how to apply 
the experience prong to proceedings that lack a history of access. This is 
reflected by comparing the Second Circuit’s rejection of the experience prong 
in Suarez because the Criminal Justice Act was only passed in 1964, to the Tenth 
Circuit’s denial of a right of access to documents filed under the Criminal Justice 
Act in Gonzales because it found that there is no history of access given the 
relative recent passage of the statute.242 Not only does this approach reject tenets 
of the right of access doctrine, but its continued application generates divergent 
case law because lower courts have not uniformly rejected the experience prong. 
 
7. Analogous Historical Inquiry 
 
Surveying the ways in which courts compare new proceedings to older 
ones with histories of access demonstrates the difficulty some courts face 
applying the experience prong to new proceedings and the creativity required 
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to fit “new institutions” into “existing legal structures.”243 This approach is 
not in line with Justice Brennan’s conception that appeals to history and an 
assessment of the “specific structural value of public access” can limit the 
potentially limitless application of the First Amendment right of access. 
 
8. Not Deciding the First Amendment Question Because Closure Was Justified 
 
Not deciding whether the First Amendment recognizes a right of access 
to a particular proceeding is supported by principles of constitutional 
jurisprudence. However, it deflects hard questions posed by the doctrine’s use 
of history. This perspective is demonstrated by American Civil Liberties Union 
v. Holder, in which the Fourth Circuit did not decide whether there is a First 
Amendment right of access to sealed qui tam complaints.244 The newness of 
the sealing of qui tam complaints may have been at issue because the 
requirement was only added to the False Claims Act in 1986.245 While the 
court did not explicitly make this point, the argument can be supported by 
the fact that the Fourth Circuit in In re U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
Section 2703(d) found that there was no long tradition of access to orders 
required by a law that was also passed in 1986.246 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s recognition of a right of access under the First 
Amendment in Richmond Newspapers in 1980 and its formalization of the 
experience and logic test to determine if the right attaches in Press-Enterprise 
II in 1986 spawned lower court case law applying the test beyond the initial 
context in which it was developed and applied by the Supreme Court. Careful 
review of the case law reveals eight different ways lower courts have used 
history to analyze the experience prong. This analysis highlights that the 
divergent approaches reflect different viewpoints as to how to evaluate 
history when dealing with proceedings or documents that lack a history of 
access because they are new or because the particular historical traditions 
involve mixed practices of openness. Because the Supreme Court has not 
addressed the interpretative questions raised by relying on historical 
traditions in such contexts, this absence has allowed circuit and district courts 
to create different approaches. It has generated divergent, inconsistent case 
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law on the First Amendment right of access. This result is problematic not 
only because it creates little consistency and offers little direction to litigants. 
It is also troubling because it undermines the impact and development of the 
First Amendment right of access doctrine, which was recognized in order to 
increase public confidence in the administration of justice, create an informed 
public, and strengthen and secure our system of government. While the 
Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the doctrine, the little 
direction offered as to how to evaluate history when applying the experience 
prong of the experience and logic test ultimately has challenged the doctrine’s 
application to proceedings that are relatively new, lack a history of access, and 
are beset by histories of open and closed practices. 
Justice Blackmun heralded the Court’s reliance on history to fashion the First 
Amendment right of access doctrine, and Justice Brennan relied on historical 
traditions because history informs the meaning of constitutional rights and can 
reflect the “favorable judgment of experience.” But, this review of circuit court 
opinions from the 31 years since the experience and logic test was first articulated 
demonstrates that using history as a tool for recognizing constitutional rights in 
this context has not lived up to its architects’ lofty conceptions. Instead, it has 
generated interpretive challenges and inconsistent case law as judges apply the 
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